Chinese Experts Examine the Assad Regime’s Collapse and its Implications
We continue to explore Chinese media’s coverage of the victory of Syrian rebel forces, focusing on Chinese commentators' explanations for the Assad regime’s collapse and its regional implications.
By Miriam Verzellino and Andrea Ghiselli
In a swift and dramatic turn of events, the Assad regime, which has ruled Syria for over five decades, has fallen. On December 8, 2024, after just a few days of fighting, rebel forces captured Damascus. The Syrian opposition, led by the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), then announced the regime’s overthrow in a televised statement. By the next day, it was revealed that President Bashar al-Assad had fled to Russia, arriving in Moscow seeking refuge.
In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we continue to analyze how Chinese experts have interpreted the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime and its broader implications for key actors, such as Iran, Russia, and Türkiye. Chinese media coverage of events in Syria was rather muted, characterized by neutral tones and a clear absence of celebratory rhetoric. There was also silence on the presence of Uyghur combatants fighting in the ranks of the Syrian opposition. Beyond that, our analysis reveals that Chinese experts have emphasized the remarkable speed at which the conflict unfolded. They pointed to the regime’s internal weakness, as well as to the lack of international support from its Iranian and Russian patrons. Chinese commentators also regard Türkiye as the clear winner, whereas Russia and, especially, Iran are seen as having emerged weaker than ever. This, along with Israel’s victory against Hezbollah, is making some of them reconsider the common narrative of the United States being in decline in the region.
The Assad Regime’s Rapid Collapse
As we have previously reported, Chinese experts did not anticipate a swift end to the Syrian civil war, instead predicting a protracted struggle. The swift fall of Damascus after Hama came thus as a surprise. It has become commonplace in Chinese media to use expressions like “一朝变天” (yī zhāo biàn tiān “a sudden change of power”) or “十二天变天” (shí'èr tiān biàn tiān “continuous changes within twelve days”) to underscore the impressive speed of the Assad government’s defeat. In their analysis of Assad’s downfall, Chinese commentators and experts have highlighted both exogenous and endogenous factors.
As to internal issues, Fan Hongda, Professor at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at the Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), observed that:
“Over the past years, although Bashar al-Assad seemed to have weathered the crisis and temporarily consolidated his regime. Yet, he failed to take measures to promote [economic] development in line with public expectations during this phase. Syria's economy has long been sluggish, and living conditions are extremely poor. According to a friend of mine, university professors in Damascus earn only about 20 dollars each month. This situation is unbelievable but is the reality.”[1]
Examining the Syrian government’s response to the restart of direct hostilities with the rebels, the director of the Middle East Studies Center at Fudan University, Sun Degang, pointed out that “the government adopted a policy of non-resistance, since they did not react to any of the attacks on Hama, Homs and Damascus.”[2] After years of civil war and failed policies, the regime ultimately revealed itself to be an empty shell, incapable of mounting meaningful resistance.
Regarding international factors, Chinese experts have highlighted the weakness of the Assad regime’s two main patrons, Iran and Russia. Li Zixin, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated China Institute of International Studies, argued that Hezbollah, a key ally of Damascus during the height of the Syrian Civil War, has been severely weakened by Israel’s military actions in Lebanon and is now preoccupied with its own survival.[3] Additionally, Li discussed the “strategy of self-restrain” adopted by the Pezeshkian government in Iran as a factor that has greatly weakened the so-called “Axis of Resistance” led by Tehran. Finally, he noted that the prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict has diverted Moscow’s attention and resources away from Syria.
Providing historical context, Sun Degang pointed out that since the 1970s, Syria has been regarded as the Soviet Union's “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Middle East, and after the Cold War, Russia has emerged as Syria's most important ally.[4] However, he explains that both Russia and Iran’s influence have since waned.
Regarding Iranian support, Sun observed:
"Iran has long claimed not to interfere in Syria's internal affairs, and if Assad were to ultimately seek refuge in Iran, it would give Arab countries, Israel, and Türkiye a pretext [to call Iran out and criticize its policies]. To distance itself and improve relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf Arab states, Iran ultimately did not become Assad's refuge."[5]
Fan Hongda, a prominent Iranian affairs expert at SISU, expressed a similar perspective, stating that “over the past year, the rift between Tehran and Assad has become increasingly apparent.”[6] According to Fan, many in Iran hold a negative view of Assad, perceiving the partnership with Damascus as a lose-lose situation.[7] Yang Yulong further elaborated on this point, suggesting that this sentiment explains why Iran supposedly prioritized Hezbollah over the survival of the Syrian regime.[8]
Chinese media also discussed HTS, whose predecessor, the Al-Nusra Front, was established in 2012 at the onset of the Syrian civil war as the Syrian affiliate of Al-Qaeda.[9] While HTS broke its ties with Al-Qaeda in 2016, it is currently designated as a terrorist organization by multiple governments, including Türkiye, the United States, and Russia, as well as by the United Nations.
Chinese media coverage reflects a degree of suspicion toward Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of HTS, portraying him as a reserved individual who long avoided the spotlight and has only began making public appearances after his group split from al-Qaeda.[10] Another Chinese journalist noted that, even though Jolani currently leads a major opposition group, this does not necessarily mean he will lead the country, as Syria's internal situation remains highly fragmented.[11]
An international reporter for the Shanghai Observer wrote that there is little hope for HTS to successfully rebuild the country, suggesting that they would need to abandon their ideological foundation to project a modern and moderate image. This shift would be essential to gain the support of both the local population and the international community, possibly including China.[12] In fact, according to Qin Tian, deputy director of the Middle East Institute at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the fall of the Assad regime may mark the beginning of a new round of crises in Syria.[13] During the Syrian civil war, he explained, the country became a source of refugees and terrorism, Therefore, the new security vacuum created by the Assad regime’s collapse could lead to the resurgence of terrorism in Syria.
Interestingly, Chinese experts have also paid attention to the digital tactics employed by the rebels to shape public opinion. In an interview, military commentator Wei Dongxu explained that HTS effectively utilized videos and images shared on social media to showcase their military achievements, particularly in major cities.[14] They adopted an “impressive public opinion and propaganda” strategy to influence public perception. Wei pointed out that, even in cases where only a few opposing soldiers were involved, HTS amplified their victories through digital platforms. Wei further argued that by sharing carefully crafted media content, the rebels successfully attacked the Syrian government, as they led many Syrian citizens to believe that the opposition had already won the conflict, despite ongoing battles. This strategic use of social media not only shaped public support but also, according to Wei, accelerated the conquest of Damascus.
Despite the focus on HTS, its tactics and future goals, one issue was completely absent in the Chinese discourse: the presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria fighting against the regime. By now, there is substantial evidence of the presence of Uyghur combatants in the ranks of the Syrian opposition. For example, Arslan Hidayat, a Uyghur rights activist and social media influencer, posted a video on X (formerly known as Twitter) in which “Uyghur Mujahideen” give a speech in a mosque in the Syrian city of Latakia. The Uyghurs refer to themselves as “immigrant brothers from East Turkistan, a region that has been under Chinese occupation for 65 to 70 years” adding, “thanks to Allah, we were expelled by the Chinese government, which oppressed, imprisoned, and killed us.” This silence from the Chinese press is as noticeable as it was to be expected, given the sensitivity of the topic in China.
The Implications for Türkiye, Russia, and Iran
Looking ahead, Chinese experts have focused their analysis on the potential impact of the Syrian situation on Türkiye, Russia and Iran. Xinhua reported the comments from some Chinese analysts highlighting the significantly increased likelihood of Türkiye establishing a permanent "buffer zone" in northern Syria.[15] Additionally, they noted a heightened risk of conflict erupting between Turkish-supported opposition forces and the Kurdish groups. According to these experts, Türkiye does not want to see Syria become a unified and strong state, and similarly to Israel, Ankara prefers Damascus to remain weak and unstable, allowing it to influence the country and pursue its regional interests.[16]
Niu Xinchun, a senior expert on international affairs at Ningxia University, also shared his thoughts on Türkiye, identifying three main goals for Ankara in the region.[17] The first concerns the refugee issue, as Türkiye currently hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees—approximately 3.5 million people. Therefore, the Turkish government aims to facilitate their return to Syria. The second, naturally, pertains to the Kurds because, as Niu explains, Türkiye considers Kurdish-led forces operating in Syria, in particular the YPG, as terrorists. The third objective is to shape Syria’s political transition. Niu argues that Türkiye will not negotiate with the Syrian Kurds; instead, it will leverage its influence in the country to resolve this issue militarily, especially since HTS has not proposed disarming Kurdish forces. In any case, Niu also mentioned that how events will unfold will also depend on the actions of the new Trump administration and how it will decide to engage with Ankara.
As for Russia, opinions vary among Chinese analysts on its future role in Syria. On the one hand, some suggest that Moscow might try to retain its two military bases on Syria’s western coast to preserve its military presence in the country.[18] On the other hand, Wang Jin, director of the Israel Studies Center at Northwestern University, stated that Russia, like the United States, has largely lost interest in further intervention in Syria.[19] Chinese experts have often characterized Moscow as an opportunistic actor in the region. While it played its cards well with its 2015 intervention, its resources have always been limited and, thus, have consistently rendered its position fragile and uncertain.
In an English article published by the Global Times, Niu Xinchun contrasted Russia’s decline with the strengthening of American military presence in the region and Israel’s victory against Hezbollah, defining this shift as crucial for the regional balance of power.[20] In another article, Niu highlighted how the US role in the conflict has evolved and could possibly continue to change, explaining that while Washington had nothing to do with the restart of hostilities between the rebels and the Syrian government, its role was more significant at the onset of the civil war fourteen years ago.[21] At that time, the US armed and trained anti-government forces in Syria and also supported Kurdish armed groups in their fight against ISIS.
Regarding Iran’s potential actions, Chinese media reported that the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement addressing developments in Syria, emphasizing Tehran’s respect for Syria's unity, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.[22] It also stressed that Syria's future should be determined by itself, asserting that the Syrian people are solely responsible for shaping the fate of their nation and cautioning against interference or destructive actions by external forces.
When asked by a CCTV journalist about the likelihood of an escalation in Iran's nuclear development, Qin Tian responded:
"We have indeed seen Iran recently increasing the scale of its nuclear research and development, and tensions around the Iranian nuclear issue have suddenly risen again. I believe this must be considered within the context of Iran’s national security strategy, which, in brief, is centered around deterrence and it rests on three main pillars.”[23]
Qin elaborated that the first pillar is Iran's ballistic missile capabilities. The second is its network of regional proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Iraqi militia groups, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Finally, the third pillar is the country’s nuclear program, which, while not explicitly aimed at immediate weaponization, preserves the option of acquiring nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent.
According to Niu Xinchun, Iran is likely to attempt building trust with emerging forces in Syria by framing Israel as a common enemy.[24] However, Yang Yulong, a researcher at Northwestern University in Xi’an, argued that such an approach is unlikely to succeed. Indeed, HTS’ leader Jolani has already declared that he will not allow Syria to be used as a launchpad for attacks against Israel or any other state.[25] In light of this, Zhao Jun, another scholar at SISU, concluded that while Türkiye emerges as the crisis’ biggest winner, Iran stands as its main loser.
This is why Yang and Fan concurred that Tehran faces a difficult choice. However, unlike Qin Tian, they do not believe that Iran can leverage its nuclear program as a bargaining chip. They predict that the new Trump administration will maintain its military presence in Syria and escalate pressure on Iran. Consequently, Tehran’s foreign policy is likely to enter a new period of retrenchment and contraction.[26]
Reflecting on these dynamics, Fan Hongda, in an interview with The Paper, echoed the comments that others Chinese scholars made when Masoud Pezeshkian became Iran’s president in July. Fan stated that “Tehran must make a choice. Iran needs a new development path, which includes improving relations with the United States and changing its attitude towards the Israeli state.”[27]
Syria and the International Community
According to Zhao Jun, although many international actors have publicly announced their positions, few have taken concrete actions.[28] Sun Degang affirmed that “on one hand the United States has clearly stated that it will not involve itself in the conflict; on the other hand, China is calling for a responsible and proactive approach, especially from major powers, because the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria must be respected and Syria should be governed by Syrians.”[29]
Regarding China’s role in Syia, it must be noted that Beijing has closely followed the situation in Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. As we have reported in a previous issue of the ChinaMed Observer, China’s Syria policy has been driven by four key diplomatic interests: opposing Western-led regime change (especially following the intervention in Libya); navigating the geopolitical struggle between the US and Russia; responding to shifting regional power dynamics; and addressing security concerns related to transnational militant groups, including Uyghur fighters. Economically, Syria has not been a priority for China. With the collapse of the Assad regime, Chinese media and commentators have largely refrained from discussing the Chinese position beyond some general reference to respecting Syrian sovereignty and, as mentioned before, describing Beijing’s position as “responsible.”
Conclusion
After having initially predicted a protracted fight, Chinese experts have identified a number of endogenous and exogenous reasons that contributed to the swift collapse of the Assad regime. These include the regime’s failed domestic policies, the weakness of its Iranian and Russian patrons, and the effectiveness of its opponents. Chinese media have described in a largely neutral tone and with no celebration. The future leadership of the country is looked at with a certain degree of suspicion.
Looking at Türkiye, Russia and Iran, the former is clearly seen as the main beneficiary of the current situation. The other two come out of this weaker than before. There is a strong consensus on Iran’s difficult situation. Tehran’s foreign policy and domestic choices are implicitly seen as a significant failure and a major correction is likely, though Chinese experts have become rather used to the lack of change.
The arrival of the new Trump administration looms large in the assessments of Chinese commentators, as they speculated about what the new President will do. Interestingly, there are signs that the Chinese discourse might undergo a recalibration with regard the United States’ position in the region. Commentators have long talked about Washington’s influence as declining, especially since the Russian intervention in Syria in 2015. Now, thanks to Israel’s victory against Hezbollah and the fall of the Assad regime, this might change. If this adjustment gains traction, it might indicate an important shift in China’s Middle East equation. This adds to the fact that while China has never wanted to be drawn into Syria, the presence of the Uyghurs among the rebel forces surely dictate attention from Beijing. Policymakers in Beijing are likely waiting for the smoke to clear, and the silence of Chinese media and commentators about these issues is telling.
Miriam VERZELLINO is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is currently pursuing a Master’s in Political Science (Chinese Language Program) at the Communication University of China. Her research interests include scientific and technological cooperation between China and Europe, with a specific focus on Italy, as well as digital governance.
Dr. Andrea GHISELLI is Head of Research of the ChinaMed Project. He is also Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Fudan University. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy making and China’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
[1] Liu Xiaoyan, Wèilái yǐngxiǎng xùlìyà zǒushì de, kěnéng bù shì Měi É 未来影响叙利亚走势的，可能不是美俄 [The future factors influencing Syria's trajectory may not be the U.S. and Russia], Changanjie Zhishi, December 10, 2024, link.
[2] Liang Lingfei, Duìhuà zhōng dōng wèn tí zhuānjiā: Xùlìyà zhèngzhì zhòngjiàn tiǎozhàn dà, huò chéng dàguó bóyì wǔtái 对话中东问题专家：叙利亚政治重建挑战大，或成大国博弈舞台 [Dialogue with Middle East experts: The political reconstruction of Syria faces significant challenges and may become a stage for great power rivalry], Southern Metropolis Daily, December 8, 2024, link.
[3] Hu Guan and Yang Zhen, Jiějú | Duǎnduǎn shí'èr tiān, Xùlìyà “biàntiān” wèihé rúcǐ zhī kuài? 解局 | 短短十二天，叙利亚“变天”为何如此之快？[Analysis | Why did the “regime change” in Syria happen so quickly in just twelve days?], Xinhua, December 9, 2024, link.
[4] An Zheng, Shēndù | Āsàdé yuǎn zǒu Èluósī, “Zhōngdōng xīnzàng” Xùlìyà chùyú shízì lùkǒu 深度 | 阿萨德远走俄罗斯，“中东心脏”叙利亚处于十字路口 [In Depth | Assad's Departure to Russia: Syria, the "Heart of the Middle East," at a Crossroads], Shanghai Observer, December 9, 2024, link.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Xu Zhenhua, Jiědú |xùlìyǎ jīng biàn chōngjí “dǐkàng zhī hú”, zhuānjiā: Yīlǎng huò jiāng bèi pò juézé 解读｜叙利亚惊变冲击“抵抗之弧”，专家：伊朗或将被迫抉择 [Explainer | The impact of the shocking changes in Syria on the "Axis of Resistance", experts: Iran may be forced to make a choice], The Paper, December 17, 2024, link.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Yang Rong, Cóng tóu jīn mí cǎi fú huàn chèn shān, tā lǐng dǎo de xù lì yà fǎn duì pài shì shén me lái tóu? 从头巾迷彩服换衬衫，他领导的叙利亚反对派是什么来头？[After changing from a headscarf and camouflage uniform to a shirt, what is the background of the Syrian opposition led by him?], Guancha, December 8, 2024, link.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Lu Yifei, Rén wù | Xù lì yà fǎn duì pài wǔ zhuāng lǐng dǎo rén Zhū Lā Ní shì shuí? 人物 | 叙利亚反对派武装领导人朱拉尼是谁？[The main character | Who is Julani, the leader of the Syrian opposition armed forces?], Shanghai Observer, December 9, 2024, link.
[12] Ibid.
[13] CCTV, Zhuānjiā fēnxī | Xùlìyǎ zhèngjú jùbiàn, Āsàdé zhèngquán dǎotái huò shì Xù xīn yī lún wēijī de kāishǐ 专家分析丨叙利亚政局剧变 阿萨德政权倒台或是叙新一轮危机的开始 [Expert Analysis | Drastic Changes in Syria's Political Situation: The Fall of the Assad Regime May Mark the Beginning of a New Round of Crisis in Syria], December 8, 2024, link.
[14] National Defense and Military Channel of China Media Group, Xù lì yà 12 tiān jù biàn, yì wèi zhe shén me? 叙利亚12天剧变，意味着什么？[What does Syria's dramatic 12-day upheaval mean?], December 9, 2024 link.
[15] Hu Guan and Yang Zhen, “Analysis | Why did the “regime change” in Syria happen so quickly in just twelve days?”
[16] Liu Xiaoyan, “The future factors influencing Syria's trajectory may not be the U.S. and Russia.”
[17] CCTV, [Xīnwén Zhíbòjiān] Zhuānjiā Fēnxī: Xùlìyǎ Wèntí Zǒuxiàng Duì Tǔ'ěrqí Yǒu Hé Yǐngxiǎng? [新闻直播间]专家分析 叙利亚问题走向对土耳其有何影响？[News Live | Experts Analyze: What Impact Will the Developments in the Syrian Issue Have on Turkey?], December 15, 2024, link.
[18] Liu Xiaoyan, “The future factors influencing Syria's trajectory may not be the U.S. and Russia.”
[19] Ibid.
[20] Global Times, “The Middle East is currently undergoing a transition in power dynamics: Chinese scholar,” December 14, 2024, link.
[21] Liang Lingfei, “Dialogue with Middle East experts: The political reconstruction of Syria faces significant challenges and may become a stage for great power rivalry.”
[22] Guoji zaixian, Zǒngtái jìzhě guānchá | Yīlǎng wàijiāobù: Jiāng gēnjù xù júshì cǎiqǔ shìdàng yìngduì 总台记者观察丨伊朗外交部：将根据叙局势采取适当应对 [Reporter Observation | Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Will take appropriate responses based on the situation in Syria], December 9, 2024, link.
[23] CCTV, Zhuānjiā fēnxī | Xiāoxī chēng Yīlǎng wèi yǔ Xù huīfù guānxì kāi chū tiáojiàn. Xià yībù hái jiāng cǎiqǔ nǎxiē jǔdòng? 专家分析丨消息称伊朗为与叙恢复关系开出条件 下一步还将采取哪些举动？ [Expert Analysis | Reports say Iran has set conditions for restoring relations with Syria. What actions will be taken next?], December 11, 2024, link.
[24] Xu Zhenhua, Jiědú |xùlìyǎ jīng biàn chōngjí “dǐkàng zhī hú”, zhuānjiā: Yīlǎng huò jiāng bèi pò juézé 解读｜叙利亚惊变冲击“抵抗之弧”，专家：伊朗或将被迫抉择 [Explainer | The impact of the shocking changes in Syria on the "Axis of Resistance", experts: Iran may be forced to make a choice], The Paper, December 17, 2024, link.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] CCTV, Zhuānjiā fēnxī | Xiāoxī chēng Yīlǎng wèi yǔ Xù huīfù guānxì kāi chū tiáojiàn. Xià yībù hái jiāng cǎiqǔ nǎxiē jǔdòng? 专家分析丨消息称伊朗为与叙恢复关系开出条件 下一步还将采取哪些举动？ [Expert Analysis | Reports say Iran has set conditions for restoring relations with Syria. What actions will be taken next?], December 11, 2024, link.
[29] Liang Lingfei, “Dialogue with Middle East experts: The political reconstruction of Syria faces significant challenges and may become a stage for great power rivalry.”
unfortunately people will see ChinaMed and assume your publication is about Medicine instead of Mediterranean.