The Iranian Elections through the Lens of Chinese Media
In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we analyze the perspective of Chinese commentators and experts on Iran’s snap presidential elections.
By Giorgia Facchini
On May 19, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and five other passengers died in a helicopter crash. This unexpected event sent political shockwaves across Iran and the world as Raisi was not only one of the main architects of the country’s domestic and foreign policy (including its “Look East” policy aimed at strengthening ties with China and Russia) but was also widely viewed as the leading candidate to succeed the 85-year-old Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Raisi’s death led to snap presidential elections, with the first round held on June 28. As no candidate won an outright majority, run-off elections took place on July 5 between the two leading candidates: the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and the hardliner ultraconservative Saeed Jalili. In a significant upset, Pezeshkian was declared the winner after securing 53.7 percent of the vote, becoming the first reformist to be elected president of Iran in almost two decades.
After the results were announced, Supreme Leader Khamenei stated that a boycott campaign led by Iran’s “enemies” had been defeated and Pezeshkian must now focus on improving the country and preserving the establishment. The new President wrote an article in Tehran Times announcing that:
“[…] my administration will pursue an opportunity-driven policy by creating balance in relations with all countries, consistent with our national interests, economic development, and requirements of regional and global peace and security.”[1]
Importantly, he also mentioned China, stating that:
“China and Russia have consistently stood by us during challenging times. We deeply value this friendship. Our 25-year roadmap with China represents a significant milestone towards establishing a mutually beneficial "comprehensive strategic partnership," and we look forward to collaborating more extensively with Beijing as we advance towards a new global order. In 2023, China played a pivotal role in facilitating the normalization of our relations with Saudi Arabia, showcasing its constructive vision and forward-thinking approach to international affairs.”[2]
With Pezeshkian’s inauguration expected for early August, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer examines the Chinese media debate on the Iranian presidential elections, focusing on pre-election expectations and examining the key aspects of the future Iranian political landscape.
In summary, Chinese commentators did not view Raisi's death as potentially destabilizing, but they began expressing concerns over Iran's future after the unexpected victory of Pezeshkian. While some Chinese analysts expressed cautious optimism, most focused on highlighting the severe challenges the new reformist president faces and the limits he will encounter. These hurdles include opposition from domestic forces, including Ayatollah Khamenei, as well as external pressure from Israel and the US, especially in the allegedly likely scenario of Donald Trump winning re-election.
The Pre-Election Debate: Candidates and Expectations
In the aftermath of Raisi’s death, there was speculation in the Chinese media that the helicopter crash might have not been a mere accident. In an interview with the Global Times, Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) commented:
“The accident occurred amid Iran dealing with frequent security incidents lately. However, this does not necessarily mean that the event was orchestrated by enemies of Iran.”[3]
In further remarks for Guancha, Liu added that the helicopter was a US-made Bell 212, an older model that had suffered from a lack of maintenance due to US sanctions. While not blaming Washington for the crash, for Liu such issues “indirectly reflect the difficulties Iran faces due to long-term sanctions from the United States and the West.”[4]
Besides this speculation, Chinese media showed more interest in discussing the implications of Raisi’s death for both Iran’s domestic situation and regional stability. Many commentators asserted that the Iranian political landscape would remain unchanged, and that the country’s power structure would not undergo radical shifts.[5] According to Liu Zhongmin, Iran’s political structure is very robust compared to other developing countries, therefore “the likelihood of the country descending into political turmoil due to this incident is relatively small.”[6]
Echoing his colleague’s view, Professor Fan Hongda of SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute pointed out that:
“The president is regarded as the second most important political figure in Iran, but, in fact, he does not have the decision-making power over Iran's domestic and foreign affairs, and his power is subject to the supreme leader.”[7]
Thus, while the death of the president is undeniably a serious event, it is unlikely to significantly disrupt Iranian policy.
Even though the domestic situation may not be radically affected, Chinese experts believe the crash could have a significant impact on the Middle East. This is partly due to the loss of Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who played a crucial role in the negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Wen Shaobiao, another scholar at SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute, suggested that relations between Iran, the US and other neighboring countries could encounter some difficulties because “the newly appointed Iranian officials do not fully understand the whole situation.”[8] Nonetheless, he also stated that the overall trajectory of Iranian foreign policy will not change radically.
Turning to election predictions, the Chinese media debate primarily focused on three of the six approved presidential candidates[9]: conservative Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, hardliner former Chief Nuclear Negotiator Saeed Jalili, and reformist former Health Minister Masoud Pezeshkian. Prior to the first round, many Chinese commentators did not consider Pezeshkian as a favorite in the race. There was a widespread belief in the Chinese media that neither moderate conservatives nor reformists were likely to win the elections, with the consensus leaning toward a hardline conservative candidate having better prospects. For example, Xinhua reporters Ma Xiao and Xi Huilin stated, “the media currently generally believes that conservatives have an advantage in this election.”[10]
Similarly, Associate Professor Han Jianwei of SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute affirmed that:
“From the perspective of factional games, reformists and moderate conservatives have been on the decline, and it is difficult for them to form independent forces and express their viewpoints within government departments”[11]
In an even more direct statement, Fan Hongda declared that “the reformists are still on the periphery of Iran's decision-making circle.”[12]
Uncertainty at the First Round
At 8 am on June 28, the polls opened for the presidential election in Iran, but the atmosphere was unexpectedly relaxed. Fan Hongda, who was in Tehran that day, noted that “seven years ago, there were long queues here during voting, but now it is a ‘come and go as you please’ situation, and not many people are coming.”[13] He suggested that this low electoral turnout could be attributed to the voting taking place over the weekend and to many people still being asleep.
However, Fan also acknowledged in another article that “the practical difficulties of national development and man-made disasters have caused many Iranians to lose confidence or trust in politics or politicians,” and that this sentiment of disillusionment mainly affects younger generations.[14]
Similarly, Liu Zhongmin stated that:
“the core issue behind the low voter turnout is the economy and people's livelihood. […] This is one of the important reasons for the decline in people's enthusiasm for political participation.”[15]
Regardless of the reasons, the turnout was indeed a record low of 39.92 percent. The only exception was at the Husseiniye Elshad Grand Mosque in northern Tehran, where officials extended voting time three times due to long queues, pushing the deadline to midnight on election day.[16] The electoral turnout is believed to have had a significant impact on the election outcome.
Against this background, Fan Hongda stated:
“high, medium, and low voter turnout would benefit the reformist Pezeshkian, the moderate conservative Ghalibaf, and the hard-line conservative Jalili, respectively.”[17]
Jin Liangxiang, director of the Peripheral Security Office and associate researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, agreed with Fan, noting that: “from the conservative perspective, the more candidates who withdraw, the more concentrated the votes become.”[18]
Observers like Nanfang Daily reporter Ling Xi claimed that “judging from the polls released before the election, Ghalibaf and Jalili had the highest support, followed by the reformist Pezeshkian.”[19] Nanfang Daily’s analysis suggested that the conservatives could likely win outright in the first round, though the refusal of both Jalili and Ghalibaf to withdraw may inevitably lead to a dispersion of votes among the conservative candidates.[20] Furthermore, Wen Shaobiao suggested that Pezeshkian was permitted as a form of controlled opposition, rather than a serious contender expected to win, remarking, “The Guardian Council approved a reformist candidate to run for election to motivate voters and increase voter turnout.”[21]
Conversely, other Chinese analysts, such as Jin Liangxiang envisioned a potential path to victory for Pezeshkian, suggesting that the reformist candidate could resonate as the perfect “protest vote.”[22] Jin speculated that “this presidential election may see voters ‘retaliate’ by voting for the reformists to express their dissatisfaction with the government.”[23]
Wang Jin, the director of the Centre for Israel Studies at Northwestern University, also did not dismiss Pezeshkian’s candidacy. He emphasized the significance of the messages conveyed during the campaign, highlighting that “Pezeshkian's appeals during the campaign were more down-to-earth.” According to Wang, these appeals resonate with Iranians who are primarily concerned over economic hardship and social issues.[24] Conservatives, instead, focused on “less practical” matters.
Challenges for the New President
Following Pezeshkian’s victory in the runoff elections, Chinese commentators began discussing the challenges ahead for his administration, Iran, and its people. However, unlike in much of the English-speaking world, the victory of a reformist candidate has not been received with fanfare by all.
For instance, Mei Xinyu, an expert affiliated with China’s Ministry of Commerce, stated:
“From the urgent perspective of Iran's current economic and livelihood problems, having a ‘reformist’ president in power is preferable to a hardline president. However, considering Iran's social conditions and power structure, maintaining stability in the foreseeable future requires a conservative, hardline supreme leader.”[25]
Mei went on to claim that while “the policy views of the ‘conservative’ candidate Jalili might have brought some new troubles to Iran's external environment, […] electing a ‘reformist’ president who is relatively conducive to resolving urgent economic problems at this time is at least the ‘second-best’ choice.”[26] It is not clear, however, what would have been the ‘best’ choice for Mei.
That said, Jin Liangxiang aptly mentioned that even with a reformist victory, Iran’s economic trajectory might not change immediately.[27] While reformists might benefit from coming to power, they will face great pressure to deliver positive results. If they fail, Fan Hongda warned, “conservatives can blame the reformists for the country's poor development” and swiftly regain power.[28]
Chinese experts cautioned against having high expectations for Pezeshkian, given the many obstacles ahead. The first hurdle is that, although the president holds significant power, he is not the most powerful figure in the Iranian system. Moreover, as Wang Jin pointed out:
“the influence of many branches of the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guard [Corps] in Iran has increased.”[29]
Additionally, Chinese scholars believe that Pezeshkian’s victory does not necessarily indicate that he enjoys strong popular support. Han Jianwei remarked that: “With the mentality of choosing between ‘bad’ and ‘worse,’ the public voted more for Pezeshkian, although they also lack confidence in his campaign promises.”[30] After all, commented Fan Hongda, the new president “himself is widely considered not to be particularly open-minded.”[31] Balancing his own preferences with the demands of both the elites and the population will be a significant challenge for Pezeshkian.
Furthermore, Chinese commentators expressed skepticism on Pezeshkian’s pledge to improve Iran’s relations with the West to lift sanctions and revitalize Iran’s economy. According to Han Jianwei, “This is a very tempting slogan, but its realization is no less difficult than promoting domestic reforms.”[32] Reflecting on the potential re-election of former US President Donald Trump in November, Han emphasized that when Trump became US president in 2016, “the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement and re-imposed the most severe sanctions on Iran.”[33]
To this, Li Fuquan, director at the Centre of Iran Studies of China’s Northwest University, added that “The US also lacks motivation to improve relations with Iran, […] despite multiple secret contacts and negotiations with Iran, the US sanctions on Iran have not decreased, but have continued to increase.”[34]
Meanwhile, Xing Dezheng and Gao Wanying, researchers at the Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, even dismissed the notion that Iran is “going to ‘look toward Washington’” as “mere hype by Western media, and that ‘Look East’ will continue to be [Iran’s] primary direction in the future.” Besides the significant influence of the supreme leader, the conservative-dominated parliament (where 230 out of 290 seats are held by conservatives), and the potential re-election of Trump, they also posited that Israel would stop any rapprochement between Iran and the West.
“[Israel] fears that reconciliation between Iran and the US/West will alleviate Iran's isolation, thereby increasing its influence and strength. Historically, during the presidency of reformist Mohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2005, Iran sought to improve relations with the US and the West, and the US policy community was also inclined to accept this. However, the process of mending US-Iran relations was obstructed by Israel. The Israeli government not only repeatedly "expressed concerns" but also mobilized lobbying groups in the US to interfere with the reconciliation efforts between the US and Iran. […] Thus, if Iran genuinely seeks to "pivot to the West," Israel is unlikely to remain a bystander and is very likely to intervene.”[35]
The strained relations with the United States not only diminish the prospects that any of the sanctions will be lifted, but also hinder efforts to address the pressing issues plaguing the Iranian economy, such as inflation, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the regime. As Mei Xinyu pointed out, the depreciation of the Iranian Rial has facilitated its displacement by foreign hard currencies, including the US dollar. The use of the currency of the American enemy, Mei argued, “erodes the foundation of Iran’s official ideology.”[36]
Also related to international affairs, Professor Liu Zhongmin noted that the current conflict in Gaza and relations with Israel demand attention and complicate any potential shift in foreign and domestic policies. As he argued:
“Iran will continue to face great pressure in managing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the challenges posed by Israel. Even if Hezbollah in Lebanon does not go to war with Israel, conflicts of a certain scale are inevitable, posing another challenge for Pezeshkian’s administration.”[37]
During the electoral campaign, Pezeshkian openly voiced his frustration over the recent stagnation of China-Iran relations. Given the sensitivity of this topic, however, Chinese scholars seemingly refrained from openly discussing if and how Sino-Iranian ties might evolve under the new president and with a new foreign minister. What we do know is that Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a message to Pezeshkian congratulating him on his victory:
“In the face of the complex regional and international landscapes, China and Iran have always supported each other and stuck together through thick and thin, continuously consolidating strategic mutual trust, steadily promoting exchanges and cooperation in various fields, and maintaining sound communication and coordination on regional and international affairs, which has not only benefited the two peoples, but also made positive contributions to promoting regional and world peace and stability.”[38]
Conclusion
Our analysis reveals that Chinese scholars viewed the death of President Raisi, the key figure behind Iran’s recent alignment with China, as a significant event but one unlikely to destabilize Iran or the region. This perspective may have stemmed from the general expectation that a fellow conservative would succeed him. Despite some observers not completely disregarding Pezeshkian’s electoral prospects, especially after the first round, his victory came as a surprise to most Chinese onlookers.
In contrast to Western analysts who welcomed the election of a reformist Iranian president, their Chinese counterparts were notably more skeptical. While pockets of optimism were evident across the Chinese press, the prevailing sentiment doubted whether Pezeshkian’s moderate reformist agenda could help resolve the myriad of socio-economic issues plaguing Iran, including inflation, social unrest and international isolation. Moreover, significant changes in domestic and foreign policy are seen as unlikely given the multitude of constraints Pezeshkian faces—from the supreme leader and the conservative-dominated parliament domestically, to pressure from the United States and Israel internationally. The seemingly inevitable return of Donald Trump to the US presidency was also cited as diminishing prospects for Pezeshkian’s hopes to mend US-Iran relations and loosen the sanction regime choking the Iranian economy.
This cautious and somewhat pessimistic outlook among Chinese scholars regarding post-Raisi Iran may reflect Chinese disapproval of the foreign policy preferences of Iranian reformists. As we have highlighted in our analyses of the Iranian press (see our 2023 report), Iranian reformists have often advocated for strengthening ties with the West and have critiqued Tehran’s emerging economic and strategic partnership with Beijing. This may explain why Chinese analysts, especially those affiliated to state institutions, have provided a more “realistic” assessment of the challenges and limitations Pezeshkian faces as Iran's new president and have highlighted the potential for a conservative successor in the near future.
Giorgia Facchini is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples "L’Orientale" and holds a B.A. in Cultural and Linguistic Mediation from the University of Bologna. Her research interests include China's governance and administrative system, and China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.
[1] Masoud Pezeshkian, My message to the new world, Tehran Times, July 12, 2024, link.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Iran’s political structure can still ensure country’s normal functioning despite helicopter “hard landing” incident, said Chinese experts, Global Times, May 20, 2024, link.
[4] Qi Qian, Yīlǎng zǒngtǒng lái xī yīn zhíshēngjī shìgù línàn, jiàng rúhé yǐngxiǎng zhōngdōng júshì? 伊朗总统莱希因直升机事故罹难，将如何影响中东局势? [How will the death of Iranian President Raisi in a helicopter accident affect the situation in the Middle East?], Guancha. May 20, 2024, link.
[5] Sòngbié zǒngtǒng lái xī! Yīlǎng zhèngjú jiāng zǒuxiàng héfāng送别总统莱希！伊朗政局将走向何方 [Farewell to President Raisi! Where will Iran's political situation go?], May 22, 2024, Sina News, link.
[6] Iran’s political structure can still ensure country’s normal functioning despite helicopter “hard landing” incident, said Chinese experts, Global Times.
[7] Xiong Chaoran, Zǒngtǒng jí wàizhǎng zhuì jī yùnàn, jiàng rúhé yǐngxiǎng yīlǎng zhèngjú? 总统及外长坠机遇难，将如何影响伊朗政局？[How will the plane crash that killed the president and foreign minister affect Iran’s political situation?], Guancha, May 20, 2024, link.
[8] Xu Jun, Yīlǎng zǒngtǒng yùnàn. Zhōngdōng huì yīncǐ chūxiàn xīn de chōngtú ma? 伊朗总统遇难。中东会因此出现新的冲突吗？[Iran's President killed. Will this lead to a new conflict in the Middle East?], Chaoxinwen, May 20, 2024, link.
[9] While 74 people, including former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, applied to be presidential candidates, the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of Islamic clerics and lawyers tasked with supervising elections—rejected nearly all applications. This included all four women who applied. Ultimately, six candidates were approved, although two withdrew their candidacies before the first round of voting.
[10] Sha Dati, Ma Xiao and Diao Huilin, Rèdiǎn wèndá |yīlǎng zǒngtǒng xuǎnjǔ yǒu hé kàn diǎn热点问答｜伊朗总统选举有何看点 [Hot Questions and Answers | What to Watch in Iran’s Presidential Election], Xinhua, June 14, 2024, link.
[11] Han Jianwei, Hánjiànwěi: Zǒngtǒng zhuì jī yùnàn, duì yīlǎng zhèngfǔ zuìdà de tiǎozhàn shì shénme? 韩建伟：总统坠机遇难，对伊朗政府最大的挑战是什么？[Han Jianwei: What is the biggest challenge for the Iranian government following the president's plane crash?], Red Star News, May 21, 2024, link.
[12] Fan Hongda, Lái xī yùnàn hòu, shéi huì jiērèn yīlǎng zǒngtǒng?莱希遇难后，谁会接任伊朗总统？[Who will take over as Iran’s president after Raisi’s death?], China Newsweek, May 20, 2024, link.
[13] Fan Hongda, Fàn Hóngdá: Shǒu lún tóupiào jiéguǒ chūlú, yīlǎng xīn zǒngtǒng “xuǎn ér wèi jué” 范鸿达：首轮投票结果出炉，伊朗新总统“选而未决” [Fan Hongda: The results of the first round of voting are out, and the new Iranian president is "undecided"], Guancha, July 1, 2024, link.
[14] Fan Hongda, Yīlǎng zǒngtǒng xuǎnjǔ dàojìshí 1 tiān, tā línzhèn tuì xuǎn伊朗总统选举倒计时1天，他临阵退选 [One day left before Iran’s presidential election, he withdraws from the race], China Newsweek, June 27, 2024, link.
[15] Xiao Yudi,（ guójì guānchá ） yīlǎng zǒngtǒng xuǎnjǔ yínglái juéshèng jú gǎigé pài yǔ bǎoshǒu pài jiāng tóng tái jìngjì（国际观察）伊朗总统选举迎来决胜局 改革派与保守派将同台竞技 [(International Observation) Iran's presidential election has reached a decisive round, and reformists and conservatives will compete on the same stage], Chinanews.com, June 30, 2024, link.
[16] Fan Hongda, Fan Hongda: The results of the first round of voting are out, and the new Iranian president is "undecided".
[17] Ibid.
[18] Chen Meiyu and Zhang Yin, Bǎoshǒu pài yǔ gǎigé pài bóyì jīliè, wèilái wàijiāo zhèngcè huò fāshēng biànhuà. Yīlǎng zǒngtǒng xuǎnjǔ jiàng rúhé yǐngxiǎng? 保守派与改革派博弈激烈，未来外交政策或发生变化。伊朗总统选举将如何影响中东政局？[Conservatives and reformists are competing fiercely, and future foreign policy may change How will Iran’s presidential election affect the political situation in the Middle East?], Nanfangwang, June 29, 2024, link.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Xiao Yudi, (International Observation) Iran's presidential election has reached a decisive round, and reformists and conservatives will compete on the same stage.
[25] Mei Xinyu, Méi Xīnyù: Zhènxīng jīngjì, yīlǎng xū bìmiǎn “yáng màojìn” 梅新育：振兴经济，伊朗需避免“洋冒进” [Mei Xinyu: To revive its economy, Iran needs to avoid "foreign recklessness"], Guancha, July 8, 2024, link.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Chen Meiyu and Zhang Yin, Conservatives and reformists are competing fiercely, and future foreign policy may change How will Iran’s presidential election affect the political situation in the Middle East?.
[28] Fan Hongda, Yīlǎng wéiyī de gǎigé pài zǒngtǒng hòuxuǎn rén, hái yǒu jīhuì yíng ma? 伊朗唯一的改革派总统候选人，还有机会赢吗？ [Does Iran’s only reformist presidential candidate still have a chance to win?], China Newsweek, July 1, 2024, link.
[29] Nan Boyi and Li Yibin, Gǎigé pài pèi zé shén jī'ān dāngxuǎn xīn yīrèn yīlǎng zǒngtǒng, zhuānjiā: Yùjì tuīdòng nèiwài zhèngcè sōngdòng, guónèi zǔlì réng dà 改革派佩泽什基安当选新一任伊朗总统，专家：预计推动内外政策松动，国内阻力仍大 [Reformist Pezeshkian elected as new Iranian president, experts: expected to promote loosening of domestic and foreign policies, domestic resistance remains strong], The Paper, June 7, 2024, link.
[30] Han Jianwei, Yīlǎng xīn zǒngtǒng de gǎigé zhī lù zhùdìng bù huì píngtǎn伊朗新总统的改革之路注定不会平坦 [Iran's new president's road to reform is bound to be bumpy], China.com, July 8, 2024, link.
[31] Fan Hongda, Bù bèi kànhǎo de gǎigé pài hòuxuǎn rén, chéngwéi yīlǎng xīn zǒngtǒng不被看好的改革派候选人，成为伊朗新总统 [Unfavored reformist candidate becomes Iran's new president], Sina News, July 6, 2024, link.
[32] Iran’s new president's road to reform is bound to be bumpy, China.com.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Zhao Yusha, Iran to continue to “look east” under new presidency: Expert, Global Times, July 7, 2024, link.
[35] Xing Dezheng and Gao Wanying, Xīn zǒngtǒng shàngrèn, yīlǎng jíjiāng yǔ xīfāng “dà héjiě”? 新总统上任，伊朗即将与西方“大和解”？[With the new president taking office, is Iran about to have a “great reconciliation” with the West?], post on CICIR’s WeChat account, July 9, 2024, link (for more English excerpts see post on X by Tuvia Gering).
[36] Mei Xinyu, Mei Xinyu: To revive its economy, Iran needs to avoid "foreign recklessness".
[37] Xiao Yudi, (International Observation) Iran's presidential election has reached a decisive round, and reformists and conservatives will compete on the same stage.
[38] Zhao Yusha, Iran to continue to “look east” under new presidency: Expert.