The Chinese Discourse on the Israel-Hamas Conflict
In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we analyze the Chinese debate surrounding the recent outbreak of violence following Hamas's attack on Israel.
By Adam Koi
On October 7, a Hamas-led coalition of Palestinian militant groups launched an attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip. In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we delve into China’s official response and the perspectives of Chinese experts regarding the war’s potential short- and long-term developments, as well as the factors that contributed to the current state of affairs.
In general, while opinions vary regarding what specifically led to this outbreak of violence and its geopolitical consequences, Chinese commentators appear to concur that root of the problem lies in Israel’s mistreatment of the Palestinians and the United States’ foreign policy in the region.
China’s Official Position
On the second day of the conflict, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning the violence and urging “restraint from both parties,” a revisit of the “two-state solution,” and an “immediate ceasefire.”[1] This aligned China with countries like Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in refusing to take a side in the conflict.
China reformulated its message following US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s visit to Beijing on October 9. While the trip was originally aimed at laying the groundwork for a future meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Schumer took the opportunity to voice his dissatisfaction with China’s response. This led to another statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, while condemning the “killing of civilians,” still saw China express its traditional position of formal neutrality.[2] On October 12, during a regular press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stressed:
“The key to breaking the cycle of Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to return to the basis of the two-state solution, resume peace talks, establish an independent Palestinian state, and achieve peaceful coexistence between Palestine and Israel.”[3]
A few days later, in the context of Israel’s massive bombing campaign of the Gaza Strip, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a call with his Saudi counterpart, further argued that “Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense” and stated that “China believes that the historical injustices against Palestine have lasted for more than half a century and cannot go on.”[4]
What Is Next? Precision Strikes or Large-Scale War?
The official Chinese response was picked up by the Global Times, which argued that escalation could lead the region into a “Sixth Middle East War.”[5] Expert opinions vary regarding the likelihood of a wide-scale conflict erupting.
Zou Zhiqiang, a researcher at the Center for Middle East Studies at Fudan University, believes that shelling between the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces, which began on October 9, is “very limited”. Moreover, the arrival of US carriers has effectively established a deterrent preventing additional actors from entering the war. Li Shaoxian, the head of Ningxia University’s Arab Research Institute, also downplays the likelihood of a new major war in the Middle East but considers further Hezbollah entanglement a possibility.[6] Wen Shaobiao from Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) echoes this sentiment, as he predicts that the conflict is likely to escalate in the coming days given Israel’s ongoing war mobilization.[7] Additionally, all three scholars believe the conflict will die down within a few weeks due to diplomatic intervention by major regional and international powers, such as Egypt and the US, to broker a diplomatic settlement.[8]
On the contrary, Senior Colonel Du Wenlong expects the conflict to continue because “Israeli military retaliation has not yet achieved any of its major objectives.”[9] Another military expert and commentator, Song Zhongping, also argues that, given the United States’ moral support, Israel may consider conducting large-scale ground operations in Gaza, despite concerns about global public scrutiny over mass civilian casualties. Song believes that special operations to eliminate key military targets and to rescue hostages would be very much in line with Israel’s combat style, but such an operation could face difficulties, as:
“Hamas has both military and civilian branches. If these fighters throw away their weapons, they may be no different from ordinary people. Therefore, if an attack is launched, it may result in greater number of civilian casualties, which is a major concern for Israel. Furthermore, the hostages being in hands of Hamas and the possible casualties the Israeli army would have to suffer are also additional concerns for the Israelis.”[10]
Some Chinese scholars contend that the conflict’s potential escalation might not only be instigated by opponents of Israel but also by Israel itself, with the support of Western powers. Niu Xinchun, the Director of the China Institute of International Relations’ Institute of Middle East Studies, characterized Israel as “Washington’s unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Middle East,” highlighting its significance in supporting Washington’s regional strategy. Niu adds that although the US may not want another war in the Middle East, its “uncritical support” of Israeli policies could have detrimental consequences and fuel further escalation.[11]
Wang Jin, an Associate Professor at the Northwest University of China, also voiced his concerns over a large-scale Israeli operation in Gaza, as it could lead into a “humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale”.[12]
Regarding the possible long-term evolution of the situation, Tsinghua University’s She Gangzheng believes that uprooting Hamas would require the complete destruction of its armed forces, which is not attainable without occupying Gaza.[13] Furthermore, Li Shaoxian and Zou Zhiqiang point out that the long-term occupation of the Gaza Strip would be a significant burden for Israel as:
“Each of the two million Palestinians is a time bomb for Israel, that’s why Israel unilaterally abandoned Gaza in 2005.”[14]
Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of SISU, in agreement with his SISU colleague Ding Long, advocates the implementation of the “two-state solution” and celebrates Chinese foreign policy for representing it on the world stage.[15] That said, for Wang Jin, any solution depends very much on Israel, which undoubtedly holds the advantage due to Palestinian political fragmentation, as while Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, the West Bank is nominally governed by their rivals - Fatah. Wang stresses that arriving at a peace treaty that all parties are willing to adhere to is going to be extremely hard without Palestinian unity.[16]
The Marginalization of the Palestinian Issue and Arab-Israeli Relations
Chinese commentators have also contextualized differently the recent outbreak of violence, with some emphasizing the importance of recent developments in the Middle East, while others underscored the enduring contradictions in the Israel-Palestine relationship.
Hamas's operation appears to have been meticulously planned. Its timing – commencing on the Jewish holiday of Shemini Atzeret – recalls the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which erupted almost precisely fifty years ago.[17] Apart from symbolism, multiple Chinese experts considered the ongoing normalization talks between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as an important trigger of this attack. Wang points out that Palestinian factions have consistently opposed the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel, demanding a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue as a prerequisite for any Arab-Israeli reconciliation. As expressed by Wang Jin, Li Shaoxian, Zou Zhiqiang, together with Associate Professor Wang Zhen from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the Palestinian question risked being further marginalized in the context of advancing negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the inevitable snowball effect that Israel’s recognition by Saudi Arabia would cause.[18] Wang Jin believes that:
“This conflict is likely to be a manifestation of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s opposition to the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel through violent means.”[19]
This explanation is shared by Zou Zhiqiang and Li Saoxian. For Zou, a “now or never” attitude among Palestinians also played a part in the attack, as he states:
“The cause for Palestine's sudden action came from changes in the external environment, which raised concerns regarding its own destiny. Rather than sit back and wait for certain death, it is better to take the initiative.”[20]
Now, after Hamas’s attack and the Israeli reaction, Niu Xinchun believes that the Palestinian issue can no longer be bypassed.[21] Wang Jin, SISU’s Ding Long, and Wang Zhen agree. As Wang Zhen puts it:
“Now, for a leader of an Arab Gulf state to resume negotiations with Israel is equal to political suicide.”[22]
In any case, Chinese experts have refrained from making long-term predictions. Rather, they simply affirmed that Israel's response to Hamas and its overall handling of the Palestinian issue will significantly impact how Arab nations perceive the future of the normalization process.[23] Nevertheless, some experts, like Li Shaoxian and Ding Long, foresee only a temporary disruption in normalization proceedings, as they believe that an Arab-Israeli rapprochement is inevitable.[24]
A Long-time Coming Tragedy
Besides the specific reasons behind Hamas’s attack, Chinese scholars emphasized the role of long-term regional dynamics. One of them is the rising competition among great powers. Indeed, as the editorial team of Chaoxinwen wrote:
“The development of the Palestine-Israel issue has always been driven by competition among major powers, and major powers have intervened on numerous occasions.”[25]
Zou Zhiqiang, approaching the situation from a historical perspective, argues that during the Cold War, the rivalry between Washington and Moscow made it impossible to establish both a Jewish and Arab state, despite the various UN resolutions (Resolution 181 in 1947, Resolution 35/207 in 1980, Resolution 36/226 A and B in 1981, Resolution 43/177 in 1988) calling for a two-state solution. The resulting proxy wars between the two superpowers ended with the Palestinian side losing.[26] According to Wang Jin, the US’ inability to bring lasting peace in the post-Cold War era opened the door for more unresolved conflicts, and ultimately contributed to the recent build-up of hatred and resentment between the two groups. This environment has allowed fundamentalist extreme forces such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to affirm themselves and rally popular support.[27]
Another element that Chinese commentators have highlighted is revenge. Associate Professor Zhang Chuchu of Fudan University posits that Hamas's assault aimed to make Israeli people experience the same perpetual fear that Gaza residents have endured due to Israeli raids and bombings.[28] Li Shaoxian and Zou Zhiqiang characterize Hamas’s attack as a “prison-break” in reaction to movement restrictions imposed by Israel since 2007, that have virtually isolated the Gaza Strip from the rest of the world.[29] They, along with Wang Zhen, also argue that Hamas’s operation was clearly fueled by discontent regarding Israeli measures to limit the presence of Muslims near the Al-Aqsa Mosque, considered by many as the third-holiest site in Islam.[30] In support of this thesis, Xinhua News Agency’s team published a list of clashes between Palestinians and Israelis since 2014, the year when direct peace talks stalled.[31]
An Iranian Threat or an Israeli Failure?
The sheer scale of the attack has led many to question whether Hamas alone possesses the capacity to conduct such an operation. Israeli politicians have thus been quick to accuse Iran of aiding Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Chinese scholars agree, with Vice-Director of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations Wang Shuming, Song Zhongping, and Zou Zhiqiang all convinced that Iran was involved, despite Tehran rejecting such allegations.[32] However, Song added that Tel Aviv’s emphasis on possible Iranian involvement conveniently diverts public attention away from the Israeli security apparatus’ mistakes.[33]
Chinese scholars have also highlighted changes in Israel’s defense mentality and domestic political dynamics. Wang Jin argues that Israel’s superior high-tech military and sophisticated security systems, such as the “Iron Dome,” have created a false sense that Israel’s defense is “impregnable.”[34] Song supports this assessment, adding that “underestimating the enemy” and “lacking a deep understanding” of the adversary is a defect shared by multiple branches of Israel's security forces in their dealings with Hamas.[35]
Additionally, some experts emphasized Israel’s recent political instability. For Sun Degang, Tel Aviv’s preoccupation with internal disputes has led it to neglect monitoring Hamas.[36] Li Shaoxian contends that security agencies were not the only victims of a false sense of security, but rather it is a problem that extends to Israeli society as a whole. In his analysis, he highlights two significant contributing factors: First, Israelis erroneously interpreted Hamas’s inaction following the elimination of senior members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in May 2023 as a sign of surrender. Secondly, the Israeli public is very politically polarized due to PM Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reform, which sparked the largest protests in the country's history. Li argues that division has permeated all levels of society, including the military. According to him:
“I believe it also includes the Mossad. The chaotic divisions in society seriously affected the Mossad response.”[37]
Looking ahead, some scholars have highlighted potential repercussions of Hamas’s attack on Netanyahu’s political career, who has long portrayed himself as “Mr. Security.”[38] Wang Jin suggests that this incident adds to the pressure he is already facing due to corruption allegations and his heavily criticized judicial reform. Wang and Li Shaoxian argue that there is a high likelihood Netanyahu will face inquiries from special commissions investigating government negligence once the conflict subsides.[39]
Shu Meng, a Research Assistant at SISU’s Institute of Middle East Studies, draws parallels to the 1973 war, which caught the Israeli leadership off-guard, leading to the eventual resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir. Shu suggests that Netanyahu may be taking tough retaliatory measures precisely to restore his government’s legitimacy.[40]
Regardless of whether Iran is genuinely involved or not, Niu Xinchun argues that there is little doubt that Israel is going to introduce tougher policies against Iran, and the US is likely to follow suit.[41]
Conclusion
The Chinese debate on the recent re-eruption of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been very dynamic, with different opinions regarding its potential outcomes, root causes, and whether it could escalate into a large-scale war.
Chinese experts hold different points of view concerning the impact of recent geopolitical developments and deeply rooted historical sources of tensions. Yet, whether implicitly or explicitly, they all agree that the recent violent escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict primarily stems from Israeli actions against the Palestinians. While the media debate predictably underscored the role of American foreign policy in the region, Chinese commentators were surprisingly quite ambivalent regarding Iran’s involvement.
Furthermore, Chinese scholars now believe that the future of Middle Eastern politics is uncertain, in particular because Hamas’s attack has successfully disrupted the ongoing talks between Tel Aviv and Riyadh. Nevertheless, some experts are confident that the process of Israeli-Arab normalization will eventually get back on track in the future.
[1] Wàijiāobù fāyánrén jiù Bā Yǐ chōngtū shēngjí dá jìzhě wèn外交部发言人就巴以冲突升级答记者问 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson answers reporters' questions on the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 8, 2023, link.
[2] 2023 nián 10 yuè 9 rì Wàijiāobù fāyánrén Máo Níng zhǔchí lìxíng jìzhěhuì 2023年10月9日外交部发言人毛宁主持例行记者会 [On October 9, 2023, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning hosted a regular press conference], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 9, 2023, link.
[3] 2023 nián 10 yuè 12 rì Wàijiāobù fāyánrén Wāng Wénbīn zhǔchí lìxíng jìzhěhuì 2023年10月12日外交部发言人汪文斌主持例行记者会 [On October 12, 2023, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin hosted a regular press conference], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 12, 2023, link.
[4] Chinese, Saudi Arabian FMs hold phone talks on Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Xinhua, October 15, 2023, link.
[5] To avoid a new Middle East war, Israeli-Palestinian issue can't be delayed: Global Times editorial, Global Times, October 8, 2023, link.
[6] An Jing, Bā Yǐ jīliè chōngtū ： Zhōng Dōng xīnbiàn jú háishì “cháhúlǐ de fēngbào”？巴以激烈冲突：中东新变局还是“茶壶里的风暴”？[Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”? Jiemian Xinwen, October 9, 2023, link.
[7] Zhao Yusha, Hamas attack ‘harsh reminder’ wave of reconciliation in Middle East won’t last with Palestine-Israel conflict unsolved, Global Times, October 8, 2023, link.
[8] Zhao, Hamas attack ‘harsh reminder’ wave of reconciliation in Middle East won’t last with Palestine-Israel conflict unsolved; An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?.
[9] Hāmǎsī shìfàng tánpàn xìnhào, Yǐfāng fàngchū hěnhuà. Bā Yǐ chōngtú shìfǒu huì chíxù shēngjí? Zhuānjiā jiědú哈马斯释放谈判信号以方放出狠话 巴以冲突是否会持续升级？专家解读？[Hamas sends a signal for negotiation, Israel answers with words of hatred. Will the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continue to escalate? Expert explains.], CCTV7, October 13, 2023, link.
[10] Wang Hui and Zhang Jingjuan, Jiēxiàlái, Yǐsèliè huì fādòng „dì miàn zhàn” ma？接下来，以色列会发动“地面战”吗？[Coming up, Israel is about to initiate ground war?], Guanchazhe, October 10, 2023, link.
[11] Niu, Xinchun, Niú Xīnchūn ：Měi duì Yǐsèliè de zhīchí kěnéng huì “ guò huǒ ” 牛新春：美对以色列的支持可能会“过火”[Niu Xinchun: US support for Israel may go too far], Global Times, October 12, 2023, link.
[12] Bā Yǐ chōngtū ruìpíng 9： Yǐsèliè dàjūn jíjié,zhuānjiā tánrén dào zhǔyì zāinánkǒng shēngjí 巴以冲突锐评⑨：以色列大军集结，专家谈人道主义灾难恐升级 [Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Analysis IX: Israeli Military Gathers, Experts Discuss Escalating Humanitarian Crisis], The Paper, October 12, 2023, link.
[13] Huang Yuehan and Li Xiaomeng, Yuánzhuō · Sì wèn Bā Yǐ chōngtū 2.｜ Nèiyōu yǐnlái wàihuàn? Mósàdé zěnme “ shīlíng ” le圆桌·四问巴以冲突 ②｜内忧引来外患？摩萨德怎么“失灵”了 [Round Table·Four Questions on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict II.｜Does internal trouble lead to foreign trouble? Why did Mossad “fail”?], The Paper, October 9, 2023, link.
[14] An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?.
[15] Zhao, Hamas attack ‘harsh reminder’ wave of reconciliation in Middle East won’t last with Palestine-Israel conflict unsolved; Ding Long, Dīng Lóng ：Bā Yǐ chōngtū tūxiǎn “ liǎng-guó fāng’àn” zhòngyào yìyì丁隆：巴以冲突凸显“两国方案”重要意义 [Ding Long: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict highlights the importance of the “two-state solution”], Global Times, October 13, 2023, link.
[16] Bā Yǐ chōngtū ruìpíng 10. Xuézhě tán Bālèsītǎn pàixì fēnzhēng:nèibù héjiě tuánjié shì yǔ Yǐsèliè duìhuà guānjiàn巴以冲突锐评 ⑩ 学者谈巴勒斯坦派系纷争：内部和解团结是与以色列对话关键 [Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict X. Scholars Talk about Palestinian Factional Disputes: Internal Reconciliation and Unity is the Key to Dialogue with Israel], The Paper, October 13, 2023, link.
[17] Wang and Zhang, Coming up, Israel is about to initiate ground war?; An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?; Ding, Ding Long: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict highlights the importance of the “two-state solution”.
[18] An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?; Bā Yǐ chōngtū ruìpíng 4. Zhōng Dōng “héjiěcháo” bèihòu, bālèsītǎnrén juéyì “bào fù ”？巴以冲突锐评 ④ 中东“和解潮”背后，巴勒斯坦人决意“报复”？[Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict IV: Behind the “reconciliation wave” in the Middle East, are the Palestinians determined to “retaliate”?], The Paper, October 10, 2023, link.
[19] Wang Jin, Wáng Jìn: Bā Yǐ wéi hé túrán bàofā jīliè chōngtú 王晋：巴以为何突然爆发激烈冲突 [Wang Jin: Why did violent conflict suddenly break out between Palestine and Israel?], Global Times, October 8, 2023, link.
[20] Zeng Yangxi and Wang Jiangjun, Bā Yǐ “huǒyàotǒng” zài bèi diǎnrán，liǎngzhě chóuhèn wéihé nányǐ huàjiě巴以“火药桶”再被点燃，两者仇恨为何难以化解 [The Palestinian-Israeli “gunpowder-barrell” is reignited again, why their hatred against each other is so difficult to resolve], Chaoxinwen, October 9, 2023, link.
[21] Huang Yuehan and Li Xiaomeng, Yuánzhuō · Sì wèn Bā Yǐ chōngtū 3.｜Xiàng Dìzhōng Hǎi pài hángmǔ hé zhànjī,Měiguó huìfǒu shēndù jièrù ？圆桌·四问巴以冲突③｜向地中海派航母和战机，美国会否深度介入[Roundtable·Four Questions on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict III.｜Sending aircraft carriers and fighter jets to the Mediterranean Sea, will the United States be deeply involved?], The Paper, October 9, 2023, link.
[22] The Paper, Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict IV: Behind the “reconciliation wave” in the Middle East, are the Palestinians determined to “retaliate”?.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ding Ding Long: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict highlights the importance of the “two-state solution”; An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?; Heavy casualties reported in Gaza, Israel after Hamas surprise attack prompts retaliation, Xinhua, October 8, 2023, link.
[25] Zeng and Wang, The Palestinian-Israeli “gunpowder-barrell” is reignited again, why their hatred against each other is so difficult to resolve.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Bā Yǐ chōngtū ruìpíng 7. Yǐsèliè fāqǐ bàofùxíngdòng, huò zhèngzhōng Hāmǎsī xiàhuái ？巴以冲突锐评 ⑦ 以色列发起报复行动，或正中哈马斯下怀？[Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict VII: Is Israel launch of retaliatory actions playing into Hamas’s plans?], The Paper, October 10, 2023, link.
[29] An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?.
[30] An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?; The Paper, Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict IV: Behind the “reconciliation wave” in the Middle East, are the Palestinians determined to “retaliate”?.
[31] Backgrounder: Major Palestinian-Israeli conflicts in recent years, Xinhua, October 8, 2023, link.
[32] Bā Yǐ chōngtū ruìpíng 8. Hāmǎsī dǎfǎ xiōngměng,Yǐsèliè qíngbào shū zài nǎ ？Zhuānjiā liánhé jiěxī巴以冲突锐评 ① 巴以冲突锐评 ⑧ 哈马斯打法凶猛，以色列情报输在哪？专家联合解析 [Critical Commentary on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict VIII. Hamas initiates fierce attack, how Israeli intelligence failed? Scholars explain it with four reasons], The Paper, October 10, 2023, link; Zeng and Wang, The Palestinian-Israeli “gunpowder-barrell” is reignited again, why their hatred against each other is so difficult to resolve; An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?.
[33] Wang and Zhang, Coming up, Israel is about to initiate ground war?.
[34] Wang Jin, Shígé 50 nián de yòu yīcì tūrán xíjī, zhànhuǒzhōng huò yǐncángzhe Bā Yǐ hépíng xīn qìjī时隔50年的又一次突然袭击，战火中或隐藏着巴以和平新契机 [Another sudden attack after 50 years. The war may hide a chance for a Palestinian-Israeli peace], The Paper, October 8, 2023, link.
[35] Wang and Zhang, Coming up, Israel is about to initiate ground war?.
[36] Huang and Li, Round Table·Four Questions on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict II.｜Does internal trouble lead to foreign trouble? Why did Mossad "fail”?.
[37] An, Fierce Palestinian-Israeli conflict: New changes in the Middle East or a “storm in a teapot”?
[38] Huang and Li, Round Table·Four Questions on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict II.｜Does internal trouble lead to foreign trouble? Why did Mossad "fail”?.
[39] Wang, Another sudden attack after 50 years. The war may hide a chance for a Palestinian-Israeli peace.
[40] Huang and Li, Round Table·Four Questions on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict II.｜Does internal trouble lead to foreign trouble? Why did Mossad "fail”?.
[41] Niu, Niu Xinchun: US support for Israel may go too far.