Seminar Summary - From the Gulf to the Middle East: The Expansion of China's Mediation Diplomacy
A brief summary of the seminar by Najla Al Zarooni (University of Sharjah) for our “China and the Middle East” webinar series.
On October 4, Najla Al Zarooni (Academic Lecturer and Senior Researcher at the University of Sharjah), together with Professor Enrico Fardella, held an online seminar on the expansion of China's mediation diplomacy to the Gulf and the wider Middle East. This was the first session of the “China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present” webinar series for the Fall 2024 semester, organized by ChinaMed Project together with the University of Naples “L’Orientale.”
We are pleased to provide a summary of this insightful seminar, focusing on the presentation by Najla Al Zarooni. Please note that this summary does not include the engaging Q&A session, which addressed topics such as Middle Eastern perceptions of Europe's role in the region and China’s stance on the UAE-Iran territorial dispute.
To participate in the remaining five webinars and interact with our remarkable lineup of lecturers and speakers, click here to register.
Power Transition Theory and the Global Security Initiative
According to Al Zarooni, power transition theory, developed by Abramo Organski in 1958, remains relevant for exploring the gradual shifts in great power involvement in the Middle East in the 21st century. This international relations theory examines the relationship between war and power parity (or disparity) among states. While a war between the United States and China over a power transition in the region is unlikely due to economic interdependence, the theory offers a framework to understand the roles of the “hegemon” and the “challenger,” and how a transition might unfold—co-dominion, deterrence, confrontation, or cooperation.
Although Al Zarooni posits that China could eventually surpass the US and project its vision of global governance, she also argues that this power transition is not unfolding uniformly across the world. Beijing is reaching power parity with Washington in East Asia, but in the Middle East, the US remains the clear dominant hegemon. However, this could change in the coming decades, in part due to China’s growing diplomatic engagement.
One of the key tools China is using to advance its economic and strategic position in the region is mediation diplomacy, particularly though the Global Security Initiative (GSI), first launched in 2022. Through the GSI, Beijing aims to facilitate the resolution of international disputes by leveraging its extensive diplomatic networks—both bilateral and multilateral—along with its strong trade ties. Beyond resolving conflicts, the GSI also seeks to shape global and regional security governance and support economic development.
The GSI was initially met with skepticism, as researchers questioned whether this abstract framework could effectively address complex global security challenges. A potential limit highlighted by many observers is China’s traditional commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
China’s Mediation Diplomacy in the Gulf
In March 2023, China seemingly demonstrated the effectiveness of the GSI by successfully mediating an end to the seven-year confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As noted by Al Zarooni, although both Riyadh and Tehran had been working toward restoring diplomatic ties since 2021, with the assistance of Iraq and Oman, Beijing played a crucial role in sealing the deal. China was seen by both parties as an impartial, external great power—one they could trust to safeguard the deal’s outcome.
This diplomatic success not only helped deescalate proxy conflicts across the Middle East but also boosted Beijing’s credibility as an international mediator, in particular in the region. However, Chinese mediation still faces significant limitations and challenges. China's success was largely due to the Middle East’s dynamism and the US’ diminishing presence, which gives space to innovative conflict resolution tactics distinct from traditional Western approaches. On a global scale, however, China may not be as effective. Additionally, in this instance, China mainly acted as a “negotiating table,” and has not yet demonstrated a capacity to take a leading role in shaping global governance on conflict mediation, with Beijing clearly not interested in filling in the vacuum and replacing the US.
China’s Mediation Diplomacy in the Palestine-Israel Conflict
The People’s Republic of China has historically supported the Palestinian cause, and following the escalation of the conflict following the October 7 attack, it has further aligned itself with the Arab and Muslim world. Beijing has maintained a firm pro-Palestinian stance, consistently expressing concern over the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip while refraining from directly condemning Hamas. Although China maintains strong trade and technological ties with Israel, Al Zarooni suggests that Beijing could potentially use these relations as leverage in the future to restart dialogue or push for an urgent ceasefire. She also argues that Beijing is showing increasing interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, traditionally dominated by external powers, as a potential area for applying the GSI.
In July 2024, fourteen Palestinian political factions, including Fatah and Hamas, reached an agreement in Beijing to form an interim national reconciliation government to administer both the West Bank and Gaza. This “Beijing Declaration” drew global attention for its supposed potential to establish a unified Palestinian authority—an important step in resisting Israeli expansion and fostering more effective negotiations between the two sides.
While this diplomatic achievement boosted China's credibility as a potential mediator, many observers remain skeptical. They note that similar agreements, such as the Cairo Declaration (2005) and Doha Agreement (2012), failed to achieve lasting reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. However, Al Zarooni posits that Hamas may now be more open to political solutions, recognizing the need to combine its military efforts with political legitimacy to advance the broader goal of establishing and gaining recognition for a Palestinian state.
Conclusion
Al Zarooni concluded by revisiting power transition theory, suggesting that it may not fully apply to China-US relations in the Middle East. She argues that Beijing is far from achieving power parity with Washington in the region, and competition between the two is not inevitable given their numerous shared interests. For instance, China has shown little interest in shouldering the responsibility of upholding regional security and thus remains dependent on US engagement in the Middle East. Indeed, although Beijing’s efforts involvement in the Saudi-Iran deal and Palestine issue has enhanced its credibility, a greater role in the region would require it to reinterpret its traditional foreign policy principles.
Despite US disengagement and the Middle East shifting its focus East, Al Zarooni contends that Middle Eastern states are unlikely to allow a future hegemon to dominate regional affairs. The Middle East has evolved since the Cold War, and the middle powers of the region have gained greater autonomy and are striving to balance their relationships. The US, China, and even Russia are all seen as valid partners in the diversified foreign policy these states are seeking to pursue.
