Seminar Summary - Evolving Dynamics in China-Türkiye Relations: Prospects and Challenges

A brief summary of the seminar by Professor Kadir Temiz (National Intelligence Academy of Türkiye) for our “China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present” webinar series.

On March 22, Prof. Kadir Temiz (National Intelligence Academy of Türkiye), together with Prof. Enrico Fardella, held an online seminar on the evolution and future of Türkiye’s relations with China. This was the fourth installment of the “China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present” webinar series for the 2024 Spring semester, organized by ChinaMed Project in collaboration with the University of Naples “L’Orientale.”

We are delighted to provide a summary of this insightful seminar:

China-Türkiye Relations from a Historical Perspective

Despite their geographical distance, China and Türkiye share a similar history. Both states emerged from multiethnic empires, having navigated modernization processes marked by external pressure and internal resistance, by nationalism and ethno-religious diversity.

For Prof. Temiz, recognizing shared historical experiences is essential for understanding the evolution of China-Türkiye relations. Against this background, his lecture focused on the period after the 1949 Chinese Revolution, with Temiz dividing it into four distinct phases.

Pre-Reform Period: Ideological Orientation (1949-1978)

Temiz structured his explanation around three levels of analysis. 

Beginning at the systematic level, the international system during this phase was strongly characterized by the bipolarity of the Cold War and ideological differences. Despite the challenges faced by Turkish democracy throughout this period, Türkiye firmly aligned itself with the Western bloc, joining NATO in 1952 and orienting itself toward European integration with the 1963 Ankara Agreement.

Consequently, on the state level, Türkiye and China were ideological rivals. However, the two states in reality did not engage with each other much, largely due to geographic distance, a lack of overlapping national interests and minimal bilateral trade. 

Even at the individual level, the People’s Republic was not a pertinent issue for Türkiye’s two major political currents, secularist-Kemalist and Islamist-conservative. Interest in China was primarily confined to marginal left-wing movements drawn to Maoism and Mao Zedong Thought.

Nevertheless, Temiz highlighted significant interest in events in China within the Turkish press, particularly during the 1960s. This mostly negative coverage stemmed largely from the arrival of significant numbers of Uyghur immigrants from Xinjiang, who quickly formed diaspora organizations.

Reform Period I: Soft Engagement (1978-2001)

Both China and Türkiye, despite vastly different political contexts, responded similarly to the rapid transformations within the international system during this time period. 

In China, following Mao Zedong’s death, Deng Xiaoping rose to prominence and initiated extensive economic reforms that opened the country to international trade and investment. Likewise, after years of severe political turmoil and violence, the 1980 Turkish coup d'état paved the way for new governments that implemented neoliberal economic reforms with the aim of integrating Türkiye into the global economy.

From a systemic level of analysis, both countries can be viewed as endeavoring to adapt to the emergence of unipolarity amid the end of the Cold War by embracing neoliberalism, globalization, and economic development and integration. Consequently, Türkiye sought to consolidate its ties with the developing European Union, while China embarked on the long march toward joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).

As a consequence of these shifts, at the state level, China and Türkiye ceased to view each other as ideological rivals, as economic priorities took precedence. At the individual level, a policy of economic engagement was facilitated by businesses and civil society groups dominating the Turkish political environment during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, despite domestic political instability, Türkiye’s foreign policy remained consistently oriented toward neoliberalism and reinforcing international trade and investment relations.

Reform Period II: Hard Engagement (2001-2013)

China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 symbolized its integration into the global economy and international institutions. Against this backdrop, a new narrative emerged that recognized the emergence of rising powers within the unipolar international system.

Türkiye considers itself as one of these power, propelled by its rapidly growing economy. Consequently, Ankara began to assert itself regionally, reorienting its foreign policy toward its neighborhood, in particular Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa.

From a state level analysis, Türkiye viewed China as an “Asian Miracle” akin to Japan and South Korea. Perceiving China as a valid trade and investment partner, Ankara pursued economic integration and engagement with Beijing, despite the concerns expressed by Turkish businesses that China’s accession to the WTO could harm domestic manufacturing. 

At the individual level, this phase saw the Uyghur issue gain prominence in Turkish public opinion, as the well-integrated Uyghur diaspora in Türkiye, along with civil society groups, shaped the narrative on Chinese policies in Xinjiang.

Reform Period III: Coercive Engagement (2013-2023)

There is a growing consensus, albeit contested, that the international system is moving toward multipolarity, with China emerging as a peer competitor to the US. Responding to Xi Jinping’s global ambitions, epitomized by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both the US and Europe have adopted more critical stances toward the People's Republic.

Meanwhile, Turkish elites, while maintaining their commitment to the partnership with the US and NATO, have begun to view China an alternative partner, on the footsteps of the strategic partnership agreement signed in 2010. This to push for stronger relations follows strained ties with the West, particularly in the wake of the regional instability triggered by the 2013 Arab Spring and the 2016 attempted coup. Moreover, China is no longer perceived by Turks as a developing nation, but as an influential global player capable of providing investment and trade opportunities. Consequently, Ankara swiftly joined the BRI and the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The Present and Future of China-Türkiye Relations

Starting from economic ties, the value of Sino-Turkish trade has expanded greatly, going from US$1 billion in 2000 to a remarkable US$32 billion in 2021. However, despite China being the primary destination for Turkish exports (US$2.4 billion in 2020), the bilateral trade relationship is highly imbalanced, with Turkish imports from China valued at ten times more (US$22.1 billion in 2020). Ankara has yet to find a way to rectify this severe trade imbalance.

Turning to investments, by 2020, Türkiye received 1.3% of total BRI investments, ranking it 23rd among 80 other BRI states. For Ankara and Turkish businesses, the aim is to absorb know-how and expertise from Chinese firms, particularly in key sectors like energy (primarily solar and geothermal energy), telecommunications, and more recently, emerging technology like electric vehicles. However, concerns have arisen over Chinese investments encroaching into sectors where Turkish firms are well-established, notably infrastructure.

On the political front, Turkish officials have expressed disappointment over the recent absence of Chinese high-level visits. While Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s frequent trips are appreciated, the lack of a state visit by President Xi is felt. Nevertheless, official diplomacy remains stable, bolstered by paradiplomatic efforts by political parties, lower-ranking officials, and municipalities. However, the influence of pro-China Turkish groups, supported by China Radio International, CGTN Turk, and the Confucius Institutes, pales in comparison to that of China-critical civil society groups in shaping Turkish public opinion.

For Temiz, security is where China and Türkiye are most at odds. Despite potential for cooperation, the reality on the ground indicates growing competition. Regionally, the two states diverge on issues like Qarabagh, Iran, the PKK, Syria, Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Indeed, the professor asserts that Beijing and Ankara espouse disparate visions, discourses, and perspectives regarding the future of regional order.

However, Temiz holds a more optimistic outlook on global affairs. There exists potential for Sino-Turkish cooperation as they share interests in addressing climate change, promoting sustainable development in the Global South, regulating emerging technology, and dealing with the repercussions of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the War in Gaza.

Assessing this relationship through an economy-security nexus, Temiz highlighted three reasons why Türkiye should reevaluate and rebalance its China policy. Firstly, economic interdependence on China is not advantageous for Ankara. Secondly, Beijing’s approach to regional security dynamics is ineffective. Lastly, the BRI, China’s grand strategy, overlooks the potential of Türkiye’s “Middle Corridor.”