Seminar Summary - Asianization of Asia: the Dialectics of China’s Resurgence as a Global Power
A brief summary of the lecture by Professor Anoush Ehteshami (Al Sabah Program, Durham University) for our “China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present” webinar series.
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On October 13, Professor Anoush Ehteshami, the director of the al-Sabah Programme at Durham University, together with Professor Enrico Fardella, held an online seminar on the “Asianization of Asia.” This was the second installment of the “China and the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present” webinar series, organized by ChinaMed Project in collaboration with the University of Naples “L’Orientale” and the al-Sabah Programme.
We are delighted to provide a summary of this insightful seminar:
What is Asianization?
Professor Ehteshami commenced his lecture by introducing the seemingly tautological notion of the “Asianization of Asia,” first coined by Japanese journalist Yoichi Funabashi in 1993 to refer to Japan’s immediate hinterland. Ehteshami has expanded the term to conceptualize and contextualize China’s resurgence and the rapidly expanding ties between the Middle East and the rest of the Asia.
While ‘West Asia’ is unquestionably geographically part of Asia, throughout the 20th century the region saw itself economically and politically tied to the Euro-Atlantic world. However, in recent decades, the Middle East’s relations with Asia have begun to strengthen due to significant geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, eliminated geostrategic trade barriers and opened up China’s western borders, granting it access to Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. Additionally, Beijing’s entry into the WTO in 2001 dismantled obstacles that had hindered its full integration into the global economy, further accelerating globalization. However, above all, global energy trade and consumption patterns have undergone a massive transformation.
Firstly, with regard to the West, hydrocarbon consumption in Western Europe and Japan has stabilized. Gulf states now suspect that they may be mature markets with limited export growth potential, especially in light of their efforts towards decarbonization. Meanwhile, the US’ fracking revolution has made the country not only self-sufficient but transformed it into a natural gas exporter, competing with Qatar for European market share.
On the other hand, China and India’s demand for hydrocarbons is exploding, with their current daily oil demand standing at 13 and 4.5 million barrels, respectively. Combined, they surpass the US, which consumes 16.4 million barrels of oil a day.
Finally, despite all the talk of diversification, Middle Eastern states have failed to wean themselves off exporting oil and gas. International events, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have only encouraged them to search for more untapped reserves. This continued dependency has made them desperate to grow their market share to justify growing production costs.
The Forces of Asianization
Ehteshami then delved into the six forces that have propelled and facilitated Asianization:
The first is energy partnerships. Energy relations have evolved beyond mere exchanges, as Asian states are now establishing multidimensional partnerships that cover fields like joint ventures, transportation and the development of derivatives like petrochemicals and plastics.
The second is non-energy trade as in an unprecedented and extraordinary transition, China is now the biggest trading partner of twelve Middle Eastern and North African states.
The third is banking and finance. Cash-rich Gulf countries have become very interested in joint financial projects with China and India, breaking a 100-year-old tradition of Gulf states depositing their surplus capital in Europe and the US.
The fourth is security. History illustrates that energy ties often beget security relations (there is a reason why the US Fifth Fleet sits in Bahrain in the middle of the Gulf). China thus is also interested in developing collaborative defense and security relationships to make sure that regional actors’ defense capabilities are sufficient to keep energy resources secure. However, due to the US’ dominance in this field, Chinese security engagement is mostly limited to countries where Washington is not present, like Iran.
The final two forces are technology and culture, the latter including education and tourism.
Ehteshami described this process of Asianization as a precursor to the Belt and Road Initiative, which is only further re-Asianizing Asia. Nevertheless, the professor noted that one must not consider Asianization a smooth and linear process that will bring Asia together. It is instead an uneven transition that is not immune from Asia’s many sources of tension, first and foremost the enduring interstate rivalries that have plagued the continent for centuries.
Regardless of possible countervailing forces, for the time being, Asianization is afoot.
Zooming in on China
In this context, Ehteshami analyzed the role of China. Firstly, he affirmed that China should not be defined as a “rising power,” but a “resurgent” one, as until the 1800s, it was the world’s premier economy. Now, thanks to its FDI-fuelled economic miracle, China has returned to the center of the global economic order. Its position as “workshop of the world” has resulted in relations of interdependence with hundreds of thousands of producers across the globe, especially in the Global South, which rely on the country’s continued success.
For Ehteshami, China’s economic resurgence has been mirrored by a heightened sense of mission among its leadership, which aims to fulfill the China Dream of national rejuvenation. To achieve this, Beijing wishes to shore up its relations with the Global South by establishing strategic partnerships and organizations like the BRICS and the SCO. Its efforts to construct “win-win partnerships” have been helped by China’s powerful narrative of being a Global South country that has managed to shake off the shackles of colonialism to become a true global power.
Nevertheless, China’s standing in Asia is not without uncertainty. Firstly, China’s economic resurgence remains dependent on US largesse. The recent decline in Chinese exports to the US and the EU is not accidental, but the result of a new mindset that perceives China as a systemic rival. Additionally, the West is seeking to impede China for achieving technological leaps, particularly in fields like AI and semiconductors.
Moreover, a new security matrix is developing to contrast China, in particular AUKUS, to respond strategically to its activities in the South China Sea and elsewhere. These security partnerships are supported by more ideological coalitions like the Quad and the “Asian Democracies,” which aim to highlight the significance of liberalism and democracy over autocracy and authoritarianism to Global South countries.
Furthermore, the BRI faces challenges, both on the international and domestic fronts. Russia's actions in Ukraine have disrupted the overland BRI route to Europe, while China’s “neutrality” has led many EU countries, like Italy, to reconsider their participation in the BRI framework. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic economic issues have led to dramatic drop in Chinese financing for BRI projects (with the key exception of those in the Middle East). These economic challenges include a real estate crisis, high local government debt, a rapid demographic transition, low GDP growth, high youth unemployment, environmental degradation, and the early rumblings of capital flight.
Coming Soon…
If you found this recap insightful, please join us this Wednesday, October 25, as Professor Amjed Rasheed (King’s College London) explains “What strategy has Iraq adopted in response to the changes in US-China relations”.
🕙 Time: 3.00 pm – 5:00 pm CET
📍 Platform: Microsoft Teams
🔗 Link: Click here to join (please do so a few minutes before the start of the event)
💼 No Registration Necessary
There have been some changes to the calendar of upcoming lectures, not all will take place on Friday 10:30–12:30 CET. For a full list of seminars and all changes, click here.